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Breaking Away from the Union?  




How can we explain the divergence of Greek foreign policy from the European Union 
(EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) since 2010? Between the late 1990s 
and the beginning of the Greek financial crisis in 2009, the country’s external conduct 
had remained relatively stable and in close alignment with EU CFSP goals. Even Greece’s 
long-standing rivalry with Turkey had been subject to the country’s foreign 
“Europeanization” policy, culminating in the relinquishment of the Greek veto on 
Turkey’s bid for EU accession at the 1999 Helsinki EU summit.2 The onset of the Greek 
crisis, however, coincided with initiatives which put the country’s commitment to the EU 
CFSP in question. The establishment, in particular, of the Greek-Israeli security 
partnership in 2010 was a striking example of Greek “activism” in the foreign policy 
domain, with the once detached, if not downright hostile, relations between Athens and 
Jerusalem giving way to the notion of an Israeli-Greek geopolitical axis.3 In the following 
years, bilateral cooperation in security, intelligence, and economic matters flourished. 
Joint military exercises, moreover, attained a notable regularity and sophistication, 
resulting in a “status of forces” accord between the two countries, an unusual arrangement 
for an EU member. Previously, the United States had been the sole beneficiary of a similar 
agreement, rendered essential due to the permanent presence of NATO bases in Greece.4 
At a time when Europe had turned its focus to the resolution of the escalating 
Greek financial crisis, the country’s conduct in the Eastern Mediterranean appeared to 
stand in stark contrast to the EU’s posture toward Israel, as articulated in the 2010 
European Neighbourhood Policy and subsequent European Council decisions.5 While the 
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EU emphasized human rights issues and concessions to the Palestinians as its policy 
cornerstones vis-à-vis Israel, Athens chose to distance itself from Brussels, surprising 
analysts with its support of Jerusalem in a number of strategic policy areas.6 Observers 
suggested that the Greek-Israeli partnership was merely a reaction to the deterioration of 
Turkish-Israeli relations, particularly following the Gaza flotilla incident in May 2010.7 
Athens certainly took advantage of the regional dynamics in order to promote its interests, 
though the persistence of the Greek-Israeli partnership deserves closer scrutiny, as it has 
not only managed to “survive” the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement, but has also 
spearheaded Greece’s diplomatic return to the Eastern Mediterranean, through a network 
of partnerships and collaborative projects with Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan.8  Today, the 
Greek-Israeli partnership is rapidly evolving into a cornerstone of Greek foreign policy. 
The perseverance of what appeared initially to be a short-term, almost instinctive, 
response to the Turkish-Israeli estrangement could be viewed as part of a wider Greek 
shift towards the Eastern Mediterranean, an area of prime geopolitical significance. 
This geopolitical shift, therefore, appears to transcend the narrow confines of a 
short-term, zero-sum material calculation, as Greek elites increasingly highlight the 
country’s role as an Eastern Mediterranean actor, a claim based on political, historical, 
and cultural factors. One could thus challenge the predominant narrative which views 
Greek foreign and security policy behavior through the prism of material, national 
interest-related considerations. More specifically, the country’s foreign policy re-
alignment could be indicative of an evolving Greek leadership self-image which is 
informed by identity-related, psychological factors, reflecting a novel “National Role 
Conception (NRC).”9 The extent to which this new NRC is incompatible with not only 
the “letter” of the CFSP but also European norms and values has yet to be determined,  
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but could potentially exacerbate existing tensions between Athens and Brussels, thereby 
undermining the country’s prospects for retaining its hard-earned European orientation.  
 
Perceptions in world politics: Rational and psychological narratives 
In order to highlight the implications of the case study, it is crucial to map the theoretical 
premise of this foray which emphasizes the impact of leadership perceptions on 
international politics. In the past, realist scholars assumed that leaders understood well 
the core attributes of their strategic environment. Indeed, from Thucydides to 
Morgenthau10 prominent theorists have espoused the notion that decision makers are in a 
position to accurately perceive parameters such as balances of power or the reliability of 
allied commitments, selecting their responses on the basis of a comprehensive cost-
benefit analysis.11 This model, articulated in the seminal Essence of Decision, leaves little 
room for leadership perceptions affecting foreign policy decision making.12 Allison and 
Zelikow assumed, in essence, that states are consistent in their pursuit of “national 
security and national interests” in the face of external threats and opportunities.13 
Friedberg clearly noted that “assessment through rational calculation plays the part of a 
reliable but invisible transmission belt connecting objective change to adaptive 
behavior.”14  
Nevertheless, realist scholars have come to acknowledge a role for perceptions 
with regard to decision making. After all, “if power influences international relations, it 
must do so through the perceptions of those who act on behalf of states.”15 According to 
Wohlforth, “the corollary of a perceptual approach to power is the realization that 
expectations inform policy.”16 But while scholars espouse a crucial role for perceptions 
acting as a transmission belt between systemic attributes and decisions, they tend to limit 
their analytical value to the accuracy of capability and hostility appraisals. In other words, 
although leaders may, or may not, possess valid perceptions, state policies are primarily 
informed by their estimates of third party intentions and capabilities. Rational leaderships 
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are thus expected to undertake a comprehensive assessment of power distributions and 
subsequently move to balance (ally) against (potentially) threatening actors.17 
Leaderships should thus be expected to “stay the course,” unless interests or power shifts 
necessitate a foreign policy adjustment. While this realist notion of perceptual factors is 
analytically robust, it clearly prevents perceptual variables from having a meaningful 
impact on interest, and hence policy, definition.   
The scholarly emphasis on the perception/misperception nexus in international 
politics has a logical explanation, as the importance of leadership perceptions with regard 
to foreign policy-making was initially acknowledged in a rather negative manner, gaining 
prominence only after the conclusion of World War II. Confronted with the recurrent 
inability of states to respond to warnings of impending attacks, military historians 
examined in detail such instances as the attack on Pearl Harbor or the outbreak of the 
Yom Kippur or the Korean wars.18 Partly as a result of this pioneering literature on 
strategic surprise and intelligence failure, perceptual factors have been treated with 
apprehension by analysts and scholars, who routinely regard them as elements that may 
lead to escalation and inadvertent conflict. Indeed, the causal importance of misperception 
leading to strategic blunders has been well established, particularly in relation to the two 
world wars.19  
The emphasis on cognitive deficiencies, however, may have obscured the wider 
analytical significance of perceptions; that is, perceptions should not be regarded as the 
only factor in case of policy failure. Even when miscalculations occur, it is far from 
certain that inaccurate perceptions were the underlying cause. In examining the erroneous 
decision of Anthony Eden to initiate the failed Suez War in 1956, for instance, one should 
not overlook the British establishment’s—rather accurate—belief that the country had 
entered a period of decline and needed to act in order to preserve its status.20  
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Psychological narratives have explored more ambitious notions of leadership 
perceptions in an effort to explain foreign policy decision-making as a process informed 
by multiple perceptual lenses. In this regard, scholars have employed variables pertaining 
to the values, motives, and preferences of policy-makers,21 with concepts such as “belief 
systems,” “images,” and “perceptions” incorporated within various analytical 
frameworks.22 A crucial assumption of these contributions was the complexity of 
cognitive and affective processes which construct images and ideas. No predictions could 
be made about how the material world is perceived in the ideational world, with scholars 
encouraged to ascertain empirically how individuals perceive a situation, process stimuli, 
and reach decisions.30 During the Cold War, for instance, a number of scholars supported 
the notion that hostile images of the Soviet Union had a profound impact on American 
foreign policy beliefs, whether related to the USSR or not.42 The existence of shared 
values or common elements of identity, on the other hand, could infuse a sense of trust 
and the desire to cooperate under conditions of uncertainty.23 Liberal scholars have long 
argued, in this regard, that democracies tend to cooperate and form alliances.24 Both 
psychological and material factors may, therefore, play an important role when assessing 
the origins and prospects of partnerships between, and among, sovereign states.  
This implies that indicators of power differentials matter when we ascertain 
security partnerships, but factors related to values and shared identities could also shed 
light on the dynamics of security cooperation. The latter category of variables is 
competently captured by role theory and its emphasis on the behavioral implications of 
role-based identities. Drawing on insights from social psychology, National Role 
Conceptions can be defined as “the policymakers’ own definitions of decisions, 
commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their 
state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate 
regional systems.”25 Various typologies of NRCs have been suggested, emphasizing 
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attributes such as degrees of assertiveness, collaboration, and solidarity in states’ foreign 
and security policy conduct.26 These classifications enable scholars to categorize different 
behavioral patterns in international politics. It also enables scholars to undertake estimates 
of future behavior, based on the country’s ascribed type of NRC.27 Hymans, finally,  
provided a definition of NRCs which appears to be highly appropriate for security policy 
analyses, capturing both material and identity-related factors: Accordingly, a NRC is “an 
individual’s understanding of the state’s identity—his or her sense of what the nation 
naturally stands for and how high it naturally stands in comparison to others in the 
international arena.”28  
Role theory can be employed to make sense of foreign policy decisions that are 
not adequately explained by realist or liberal accounts, such as the decision of Ukraine 
and Belarus to reject a nuclear capability after the collapse of the USSR.29 Finally, major 
foreign policy adjustments are amenable to role theory explanations, particularly when 
material considerations (with an emphasis on balances of power and capabilities) have 
remained relatively stable. The vastly different Japanese responses, for instance, to the 
1991 Gulf War and the 2003 war in Iraq have been attributed to the decline of the 
country’s pacific and multilateralist role conception and the corresponding rise of a NRC 
which favors international engagement and security policy activism.30  
Greece’s major attitudinal shift towards Israel since 2009 could, in this regard, 
constitute an appropriate test for the applicability of role theory in international politics. 
Was Greece’s foreign and security policy realignment predicated on shifting dynamics of 
power and interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, or was the Greek strategic shift 
informed, instead, by perceptual adjustments related to Greek NRCs? Finally, it would be 
interesting to ascertain whether material and ideational considerations have a 
differentiated effect on Greek foreign and security policy before and after the 2009 
benchmark. After all, what may have been initiated as a mere response to regional 
dynamics may have evolved into a long-term doctrine, informed by deep-rooted beliefs. 
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A short-term affair? 
For more than six decades, relations between Athens and Jerusalem had been detached, 
if not downright hostile. From Greece’s long-held support of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization to its courtship of the Syrian regimes of Hafez and Bashar al-Assad, Israel 
viewed the posture of its Mediterranean neighbor with apprehension.31 The bilateral 
relationship hit an all-time low in 1973, when the Greek government “refused to provide 
bases and facilities to the American airlift of weapons to Israel” during the Yom Kippur 
War.32 In 2009, however, this equilibrium was overturned, starting with the exchange of 
high-level visits between the two capitals. Cooperation gradually flourished, with treaties 
and agreements concluded and enacted at an impressive pace. For Israeli and Greek 
commentators, this evolving relationship reflected a power balancing logic since it 
coincided with the rapid deterioration of Israeli-Turkish relations.33 Indeed, a historically 
close friend of the Arab world, Greece surprised analysts with this dramatic policy shift, 
which was (and still is) largely attributed to the gradual deterioration of Israeli-Turkish 
relations from 2008, which climaxed with the 2010 Gaza flotilla incident.34  
It was only natural, then, that this narrative would cast a shadow over the long-
term prognosis of Greek-Israeli relations. The prospect of a “détente” between Ankara 
and Jerusalem generated skepticism about the future of Greek-Israeli cooperation.35 
Turkey, after all, is a major “player” in the Eastern Mediterranean, possessing a robust 
track record of cooperation with Israel, ever since prime ministers Menderes and Ben-
Gurion upgraded relations to include joint military and intelligence undertakings.36 
Another high point in Israeli-Turkish relations was reached in the early 1990s, when the 
two countries developed a strategic partnership aimed at curbing Iraqi, Iranian, and 
crucially, Syrian, ambitions to alter the status quo in the Middle East.37 According to this 
logic, Turkey’s clout in security and economic terms could undermine the strategic value 
of the Greek-Israeli relationship, should Ankara mend fences with Jerusalem, rendering 
the Israeli-Greek axis relatively unimportant, if not obsolete.  
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In mid-2016, six years after the Gaza flotilla crisis, Israel and Turkey signed an 
agreement to normalize relations. The deal included elements of compensation for the 
casualties of the flotilla and a minor easing of the Israeli blockade enforced in the Gaza 
Strip, a long-term Turkish aspiration.38 The US-brokered agreement came after powerful 
political and economic stakeholders in both Ankara and Jerusalem lobbied for the 
restoration of the partnership, which had proven beneficial to both parties in the security 
domain. While incomplete, the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement has been gaining 
momentum, aided by resilient commercial ties between the two countries, the possibilities 
for mutually advantageous synergies in the energy sector and the consistent mediating 
efforts of the Obama administration.39 Israel’s growing potential as a natural gas exporter 
fueled the impetus for the renewal of bilateral cooperation. The discovery of substantial 
hydrocarbon deposits offshore Israel (and Egypt) has engendered a heated debate in Israel 
regarding optimal export routes. Turkey is viewed by key energy companies, as well as 
by diplomatic circles in Ankara and Washington, as a regional energy “hub” through 
which Eastern Mediterranean gas could reach European markets, at a time when both the 
United States and the EU are striving to diversify Europe’s energy supply sources and 
hence reduce the continent’s historical dependence on Russian hydrocarbons.40 
Nevertheless, Israeli-Greek relations appear to be impervious to these 
developments, as demonstrated by the “status of forces” accord of 2015, a comprehensive 
agreement on hosting Israeli or Greek military personnel on Greek or Israeli territory, 
respectively.41 Joint military maneuvers, meanwhile, have attained a notable regularity 
and sophistication, with the Greek and Israeli air forces undertaking complex exercise 
scenarios throughout an operational theater that extends from the Israeli Negev desert to 
the Greek mountainous range of Olympus.42 Intelligence cooperation between the two 
countries is bolstered, culminating in operations such as the interception of a Gaza-bound 
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flotilla in 2011 by Greek security forces.43 At the same time, both Greece and the Republic 
of Cyprus have increased armament purchases from their Mediterranean neighbor, widely 
regarded as a global leader in high-tech weaponry.  
The partnership is not limited to the military domain. Agreements on economic 
and technical cooperation are also being negotiated and concluded on a frequent basis, 
indicating a desire to further develop bilateral cooperation. Bilateral ties have expanded 
to include civil society and the commercial sector in both countries, indicating the 
establishment of a “soft-power” basis upon which interactions are conducted. The 
increase of tourist flows between the two countries is telling. Before 2010, an average of 
150,000 Israeli tourists visited Greece annually, while by 2016, their number had 
increased to approximately 600,000.44 In the politically sensitive energy realm, Israel and 
Greece have not only agreed to link their electricity networks through Cyprus and Crete, 
but have also bestowed the ambitious “East-Med” gas pipeline project with a degree of 
political backing which appears to be surprising when one considers the relative economic 
merits of the alternative (Turkish) option. The longest and deepest (below 3 kms in places) 
sub-sea gas pipeline in the world is projected to carry Mediterranean gas to European 
markets through the Cypriot and Greek Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), with an 
estimated cost of six billion Euros and a tentative completion date of 2025.45  
It is worth mentioning at this point that the Greek-Israeli partnership enjoys the 
support of all major political parties in Greece. The left-leaning government in Athens, 
elected in 2015, featured a number of influential anti-Israeli figures (including an openly 
pro-Palestinian prime minister, Alexis Tsipras). Nevertheless, cooperation between the 
two nations proved to be surprisingly resilient. This is a major turn of events, as the 
incumbent party strongly opposed military cooperation with Israel in its governmental 
program.46 Since George Papandreou inaugurated high-level Greek-Israeli consultations 
in 2009, all administrations in Athens have been consistent with this paradigm, without a 
single incident of transgression. And while one could suggest that the United States might 
be behind the Greek-Israeli partnership, there is little evidence of relevant activity, despite 
the historical promotion of regional cooperation under American patronage. US-Israeli 
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relations in recent years have been complicated, with the occasional tense exchanges 
between the Netanyahu government and the Obama administration.  
These realities cannot preclude the influence of material factors on the 
development of Greek-Israeli relations. On the contrary, the Papandreou government in 
2009 could have well turned to Israel with a view to capitalizing on the Israeli-Turkish 
divide. A more benign interpretation of events is that Athens merely tried to rectify a 
historical omission by establishing a high-level dialogue with Jerusalem in a 
geopolitically turbulent part of the world. The intensification and resilience of 
cooperation, however, could indicate that deeper, inner dynamics have come into play. 
The described dynamics fit the criteria of constructivist accounts of security 
cooperation. Alliances and security communities are gradually built on the basis of 
mutual trust and shared understandings about interests and threats faced by the actors 
involved. This is a step-by-step process with “humble” beginnings (military to military 
cooperation for instance) which gradually produces a trickle-down effect to other societal 
levels. The theoretical assumption is that the advancement of collaboration can have an 
impact on the identities of states, due to interactions among the various groups involved. 
Adler and Barnett showed that such patterns may subsequently lead to a broadening and 
deepening of cooperation, culminating in the establishment of a security community.47 
This “perceptual” hypothesis suggests that the trajectory of Greek-Israeli relations 
may have reached a stage where it is no longer dependent on the purported Israeli-Turkish 
rapprochement, to the extent that it is empowered by deeper, ideational factors. The 
implications are important since our goal is to reflect on the impact of identity-related 
variables on the resilience of security partnerships. While power balances and common 
interests remain crucial in explaining patterns of international cooperation, psychological 
factors have an important role to play in determining the scope and longevity of interstate 
partnerships. In this manner, objective conditions and shared beliefs may bolster each 
other’s effect. Indeed, alliances contingent on power and/or interests can be vulnerable to 
exogenous shocks such as power shifts,48 in addition to endogenous concerns such as the 
so-called fear of “entrapment,”49 whereas state-to-state relations based on shared beliefs 
may turn out to be particularly durable. The suggested thesis offers a plausible answer to 
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the perseverance of Greek-Israeli security cooperation under volatile and occasionally 
tense, domestic and international, political conditions. 
Commentators have noted that Greece’s new friendship risks alienating the 
country from Brussels, particularly since the EU has recently adopted a critical stance vis-
à-vis Israel, highlighting the Union’s soft power appeal in its effort to promote regional 
stability and a resolution of the Palestinian issue. The EU’s tough 2016 resolution on 
Israeli settlement activities, for example, was met with fierce Greek resistance before 
Athens succumbed to diplomatic pressure by its EU partners.50 Earlier in 2015, Greece 
had become the second EU member to object the Union’s guidelines on labelling Israeli 
products manufactured beyond the 1949 armistice lines.51 The essence of the EU 
approach towards the Eastern Mediterranean lies at the crossroads of human rights 
promotion, intercultural dialogue and economic development. However, the EU could 
find itself adopting a worldview which is more compatible with Israeli (and Greek) 
sensitivities. The advent of Islamist terrorism, for instance, has rendered governments 
across Europe more receptive to Israel’s uncompromising approach in security affairs.52 
The terrorist attacks in France and Belgium continue to reverberate through the echelons 
of EU capitals, where the once dominant narratives prioritizing tolerance and 
multiculturalism sound increasingly unconvincing to domestic constituencies. 
Irrespective of the mood in Brussels, there is little doubt among Greeks that the 
country is “returning” to the Eastern Mediterranean. Maps highlighting Greece as part of 
the region, as opposed to showing either the Balkan peninsula or the European Union are 
now making the rounds in Greek media outlets. The Greek press provides extensive (and 
positive) coverage to Egyptian-Greek, Israeli-Greek and other regional summits and high-
                                                          
50   EU adopts resolution criticising Israeli settlement activity, The Guardian, January 18, 2016, at 
www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/18/eu-adopts-resolution-criticising-israeli-settlement-activity-occupied-
palestinian-territories, (accessed May 23, 2017).  
51   Greece Rejects EU Labeling Guidelines After PM Calls Jerusalem Israel’s Capital, The Tower Magazine, 
February 12, 2015, at http://www.thetower.org/2633-greece-rejects-eu-labeling-guidelines-after-pm-calls-
jerusalem-israels-capital, (accessed April 29, 2017).  
52  Statement by the Spokesperson on the Latest Attacks in Tel Aviv, Petah Tikvah and Jerusalem, EU External 
Action Service, Brussels, March 9, 2016, at https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage/2834/statement-by-the-spokesperson-on-the-latest-attacks-in-tel-aviv-petah-tikvah-and-jerusalem__en 
(accessed April 10, 2017); Israeli Tech Can Help EU Fight Terror, Peres Tells French PM, Times of Israel 
website, March 25, 2016, at www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-tech-can-help-eu-fight-terror-peres-tells-french-pm 
(accessed April 10, 2017); PM Netanyahu Speaks with EU High Representative Mogherini, Israel MFA Press 
Release, February 12, 2016, at http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2016/Pages/PM-Netanyahu-speaks-with-EU-
High-Representative-Mogherini-12-February-2016.aspx (accessed April 18, 2017); HN: EU Must Learn from 
USA, Israel in Fighting Terrorism, Prague Daily Monitor, March 24, 2016, at 




level gatherings.53 At the same time, Greek policy planners seem to acknowledge (or 
perhaps fall back to?) the idea of a historical nation with a distinct culture which finds 
itself increasingly vulnerable and isolated from the rest of the world. This self-image 
could, theoretically, enable Greeks to identify with a long-standing perception of Israel 
held among Jews.54 Finally, the two nations’ emerging identities as bastions of stability, 
secularism and democracy in a volatile region could be reinforcing perceptions of mutual 
affinity, at a time when authoritarianism and radicalism engulf large parts of the 
Mediterranean, including Greece’s historical rival, Turkey.  
These developments, finally, were concurrent with the “rift” between Athens and 
Brussels. In this regard, a possible (though not necessarily causal) link can be argued to 
exist between the Greek financial crisis and the country’s foreign policy realignment. As 
the Greek crisis was unfolding, with instances of deadlock and tense, if not bitter, 
negotiations, the European self-identification of Greek leaders gradually eroded. Between 
the collapse of the Greek junta in 1974 and the onset of the Greek crisis in 2009, Europe 
was the main provider of Greece’s international identity. As the financial crisis deepened, 
pro-European sentiments and statements became sparse and rather weak, whereas support 
for regional cooperation and alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean was bolstered.  
Are we therefore witnessing the gradual distancing of another EU member state 
from the European integration process? If so, is the Greek financial crisis to blame? There 
is substantial scope for research here. While numerous studies have examined the impact 
of the Greek crisis on the country’s economy and society, its foreign and security policy 
implications have largely remained unexplored.55 Theoretically, a foreign policy 
adjustment that coincided with the escalation of a major domestic crisis alludes to the 
existence of a link between domestic upheaval and foreign policy posture, with NRCs 
assuming the role of a “transmission belt” between the different levels of analysis. 
Through its impact on leadership identities, the Greek crisis could have indeed 
engendered a long-lasting effect on the county’s international self-conception.  
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